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Abstract 
We examined the replicability of the co-witness suggestibility effect originally reported by 
Garry et al. (2008) by testing participants from 10 countries (Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, 
Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, total N = 486). Pairs of 
participants sat beside each other, viewing different versions of the same movie while 
believing that they viewed the same version. Later, participant pairs answered questions 
collaboratively, which guided them to discuss conflicting details. Finally, participants took a 
recognition test individually. Each of the 10 samples replicated the Garry et al. finding: 
Participants often reported on the final test a non-witnessed answer that their co-witness had 
stated during the collaboration phase. Such co-witness suggestibility errors were especially 
likely when the witness had not disputed the co-witness’s report during the collaboration 
phase. The results demonstrate the replicability and generalizability of the co-witness 
suggestibility effect. (143 words) 
 
Keywords: co-witness suggestibility effect, memory conformity, eyewitness memory, post-
event conversation, multi-lab replication project. (5 keywords)
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General Audience Summary 
When police investigators, journalists, lawyers, and judges aim to determine the 
facts of a crime, eyewitness testimony can be crucial. Often in criminal cases, multiple 
witnesses observe the crime.  Co-witnesses might remember the details of the event 
differently, due to differing viewpoints, differences in arousal or attention, or mistakes due to 
the fallibility of autobiographical memory. Co-witnesses often talk amongst themselves 
before being interviewed by police. These discussions raise the possibility that some 
witnesses’ subsequent statements to the police, or in court, may be distorted by 
misinformation they received from other witnesses.  
To explore this possibility, applied memory researchers have exposed co-witnesses 
to subtly different versions of an event and then measured the extent to which those witnesses 
(who were encouraged to talk to one another about the crime) distorted each other’s later 
reports of that event. Some of these studies used polarized video projectors to present the 
event: Co-witnesses sat next to each other viewing the same screen while (unbeknownst to 
them) seeing slightly different versions of a movie (Garry et al., 2008; Kanematsu et al., 
1996/2003). After a short delay, co-witness pairs tried to answer questions about the event 
together, including questions about details that differed between the two movie versions (e.g., 
one member of the pair might have seen a picture of the Eiffel Tower on the wall, whereas the 
other might have seen a picture of the Leaning Tower of Pisa). This collaborative recall 
created opportunities for co-witnesses to report to their partners their memories of details that 
differed from what their partners had seen. Finally, participants individually completed a 
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memory test about what they had observed.  
The studies by Kanematsu et al. (1996/2003) and Garry et al. (2008) —conducted in 
Japan and New Zealand, respectively— found that people sometimes reported seeing details 
they had only heard about from their co-witness. To assess the replicability of this co-witness 
suggestibility effect, we collected data using the procedure and materials described by Garry 
et al. with similar equipment and comparable translated instructions in 10 countries: Brazil, 
Canada, Colombia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom.  
Across the 10 samples, we replicated the effect originally observed by Garry et al. 
(2008). These results indicate that this co-witness suggestibility effect is robust and common 
to many cultures. Criminal justice professionals (e.g., investigators, judges, lawyers) and 
jurors should be aware of the possibility of memory conformity when co-witnesses may have 
discussed the event in question. We also found that participants conformed to their partner 
mostly when they had not contradicted their partner’s report during the discussion. Further 
research is needed to reveal the conditions under which discussion among co-witnesses is 
more versus less likely to lead to false reports and to explore for cultural differences in co-
witness dynamics.  
(460 words)
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Eyewitness Memory Distortion Following Co-Witness Discussion: A Replication of 
Garry, French, Kinzett, and Mori (2008) in Ten Countries 
Crimes are frequently witnessed by two or more people, and co-witnesses to crimes 
often discuss the event shortly afterward (Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & Wright, 
2008). Many studies have shown that such discussion can lead witnesses to integrate 
elements of a co-witness’s report into their own reports of the shared experience (e.g., 
Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Gabbert, Memon, 
& Wright, 2007; Garry, French, Kinzett, & Mori, 2008; Hewitt, Kane, & Garry, 2013; Hope, 
Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008; Kanematsu, Mori, & Mori, 1996/2003; Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006; Paterson, Kemp, & McIntyre, 2012; Tainaka, Miyoshi, & Mori, 2014; see 
Condon, Ritchie, & Igou, 2015, for a comprehensive review). This phenomenon, the co-
witness suggestibility effect, indicates that people’s memories can easily be distorted 
following discussion with a co-witness. 
Memory researchers have employed three approaches to examine the co-witness 
suggestibility effect. In one approach, participants watch a video of a crime with a 
confederate who subsequently provides the misinformation (Bodner, Musch, & Azad, 2009; 
Bright-Paul, Jarrold, Wright, & Guillaume, 2012; Jack, Zydervelt, & Zajac, 2014; Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006; Paterson et al., 2012). In a second approach, participant pairs watch a video on 
separate screens and (unbeknownst to them) view different versions of the video (Gabbert et 
al., 2003; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006; see Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 
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2009, for a review). A third approach, and the focus of this study, uses the Manipulation of 
Overlapping Rivalrous Images technique (hereafter the MORI technique; Mori, 2007).  
In the MORI technique, two different versions of a video are displayed on the same 
translucent screen using two rear-projected video projectors that display polarized images. 
One projector transmits light waves on the vertical plane, whereas the other transmits waves 
on the horizontal plane. Participants wear polarizing glasses allowing them to see only one of 
the two versions of the movie. This technique enables researchers to present different 
versions of the same video to participant pairs without them suspecting the duality. Although 
they appear to be watching the same video, a set of critical details is manipulated such that 
each participant sees a different version of each critical detail. In other co-witness techniques, 
participants may become suspicious about the manipulation when they find differences in 
their accounts. With the MORI technique, the attenuation of this possibility may enable 
laboratory approximation of real-life communication of misperceptions between witnesses.  
Studies using the MORI technique have demonstrated the co-witness suggestibility 
effect under various situations and with different ages, genders, and interpersonal relations 
among the co-witness pairs (French, Garry, & Mori, 2008, 2011; Garry et al., 2008; 
Hirokawa, Matsuno, Mori, & Ukita, 2006; Kanematsu et al., 1996/2003; Mori & Kitabayashi, 
2009; Mori & Mori, 2008; Mori & Takahashi, 2012; Tainaka et al., 2014). Research shows 
that misinformation gleaned from co-witnesses is particularly powerful when individuals do 
not have a clear recollection on which to rely, or when the participant views the co-witness as 
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more confident or as having a more reliable memory (Wright et al., 2009). Co-witness 
memory conformity is also influenced by participant characteristics. For example, socially 
avoidant participants tend to conform less whereas socially anxious participants tend to 
conform more (Wright, Busnello, Buratto, & Stein, 2012; Wright, London, & Waechter, 
2010). Partner characteristics may also play a role, as participants tend to conform more 
towards familiar than unfamiliar partners (French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008) and more 
towards younger than older adults (Davis & Meade, 2013; Meade, McNabb, Lindeman, & 
Smith, 2017).  
The literature may seem to have established the robustness of the co-witness 
suggestibility effect. However, awareness of threats to replicability has greatly increased 
among psychologists in recent years (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The 
reality of the problem was brought home by Nosek and 269 contributing authors, who 
reported direct replications of 100 experiments published in three major psychology journals 
in 2008 (Open Science Collaboration, 2015): Fewer than half of the replication attempts 
yielded a statistically significant effect. Such findings have led to calls for statistically 
powerful, preregistered replications to assess the robustness of effects (e.g., Lindsay, 2015; 
Simons, Holcombe, & Spellman, 2014). “Preregistration” entails specifying in advance the 
participants, materials, procedures, measures, exclusions, and analyses of a study (Lindsay, 
Simons, & Lilienfeld, 2016).  
To address concerns regarding the replicability of the co-witness suggestibility effect 
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as found by Garry et al. (2008), we repeated the experiment in 10 countries: Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. These 
countries were selected on the basis of interpersonal contacts among researchers interested in 
co-witness suggestibility. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first tests of the effect 
conducted in South America, continental Europe, and Asia outside of Japan. We chose the 
Garry et al. study to replicate with multi-lab samples because it used the MORI technique to 
create the discrepancies among what co-witnesses observed. As stated above, experiments 
using the MORI technique have advantages over other procedures, because the discrepancies 
between the two version of the movies are manipulated without using a confederate (i.e., 
Paterson & Kemp, 2006) and co-witnesses observe the movies together rather than separately 
(i.e., Gabbert et al., 2003).  
Method 
Participants 
The study tested 10 samples of university undergraduates collected in two batches, 
with 486 participants in total (see Table 1). The first batch of samples was collected in Japan, 
Malaysia, Poland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The Japanese team was the first to 
replicate the experiment, with the same sample size as the original study; N = 40. Then, the 
other four groups followed with a larger sample size of around 60. We had determined the 
sample sizes at the time of the ethical approval applications before we conducted the 
experiments. The Japanese sample consisted of 40 students from Aichi University, the 
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Malaysian sample of 64 Chinese-Malaysian students from the University of Nottingham – 
Malaysia Campus, the Polish sample of 62 students from Jagiellonian University, the Turkish 
sample of 60 students from Koç University, and the British sample of 60 students from the 
University of Warwick.  
 
Table 1. Demographic information of the participants from the 10 samples.  
Country N Females Males Mean Age SD Age Age Range 
Brazil 40 21 19 21.9 2.58 18-28 
Canadaa 42 30 11 22.6 4.45 19-41 
Colombia 40 37 3 19.5 1.10 18-23 
India 40 22 18 26.2 4.30 19-37 
Japanb 40 33 7 20.2 0.58 19-22 
Malaysia 64 36 28 20.3 1.80 17-27 
Poland 62 41 21 21.8 2.05 18-27 
Portugal 40 34 6 19.7 2.44 18-26 
Turkey 60 34 26 20.8 1.20 19-24 
United Kingdoma,b 58 51 3 18.6 1.82 18-31 
aOne Canadian and four UK participants did not indicate a gender. 
bWe removed two Japanese pairs who did not follow the instructions and one UK pair for which there were 
technical difficulties with the projectors. The Japanese pairs were replaced by two new pairs, but the UK pair 
was not replaced. 
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The data from the first batch were analyzed to assess the replicability of the co-
witness suggestibility effect and reported at the meeting of the Society for Applied Research 
in Memory and Cognition in 2017 (see slides [https://osf.io/fsnpx/]) to invite researchers 
from additional countries. Five more samples were then collected as the second batch1: The 
Brazilian sample consisted of 40 students from the Federal University of Santa Catarina, the 
Canadian sample of 42 students from the University of Victoria, the Colombian sample of 40 
students from Pontifical Xavierian University, the Indian sample of 40 students from the 
National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences, and the Portuguese sample of 40 
students from the University of Minho. This second batch of studies was preregistered 
(https://osf.io/gtwrc/register/564d31db8c5e4a7c9694b2c2)1. We set the same sample size of 
40 as in the Garry et al. (2008) study for each of the second batch. The results of the two 
batches were comparable so all are reported together.  
All students participated in pairs for course credit or a small financial reward and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. We did not control the interpersonal relations 
of the pairs. Therefore, some pairs knew each other while others did not. They were all naive 
to the purpose of the study, which had been approved by the local ethics committee of each 
participating university. We obtained written informed consent from all participants. 
                                               
1The details of the procedure were specified on the Open Science Framework in advance of the 
second wave of data collection, but we neglected to complete the formal registration process until July 
25, 2018. The preregistration ID is http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/GTWRC. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
We used the video created by Takarangi, Parker, and Garry (2006) and used by 
Garry et al. (2008). The video depicts simulated thefts committed by an electrician (“Eric”) 
working in someone’s house when the homeowner is away. There are two versions of the 
same movie, which are identical except for eight critical details. Takarangi et al. filmed only 
one version of the movie and then digitally altered the clip to create the critical details. For 
example, there is a picture of the Eiffel Tower on the wall in one version and a picture of the 
Leaning Tower in the other. The video lasts 6 minutes and 34 seconds and does not contain 
audio. All materials are available on the OSF page (https://osf.io/j5f82/).  
Figure 1 illustrates the equipment set-up for the MORI technique. Both versions of 
the video were projected onto the back of a translucent projection screen. The screen was 
made of a 5-mm-thick pane of plain ground glass (45 x 60 cm). We used two LED projectors 
(TAXAN, KG-PL021X) mounted on a stand, one above the other, with one tilted slightly 
upward and the other slightly downward, so that their two images overlapped on the screen. 
The images were about 30 x 40 cm in size on the screen located at a distance of 
approximately 170 cm from participants. Polarizing filters were attached in front of the lens 
of each projector, one placed vertically and the other horizontally. For each pair of 
participants, one set of sunglasses allowed the wearer to view the vertically polarized image 
while blocking the horizontally polarized one, and the other set of glasses did the opposite.   
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Figure 1. Equipment setting for the MORI technique showing a pair of the differing scenes; 
the electrician watching a picture on the wall. For the sake of illustration, the polarized lenses 
in the sunglasses are depicted as having different patterns but in reality the sunglasses looked 
identical. 
 
Procedure 
Following the procedure used by Garry et al. (2008), after providing informed 
consent, each participant pair was seated side by side in front of the screen. Then the pair was 
told that the experiment was about people’s sensory impressions at different levels of visual 
acuity. We used the following instructions, or equivalent translated versions (native speakers 
of Japanese, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish, and Turkish with good knowledge of English and 
the experimental procedure translated the English instructions into each language): 
“We are interested in people’s sensory impressions at different levels of visual acuity. 
Visual acuity basically means how well you can see. So, for example, right now you 
all should have 100% visual acuity, either because your eyes work properly or 
because you have correcting glasses on. We want to know what happens to people’s 
Video clip B
LED projectors 
Half-transparent 
screen Viewer B
Viewer APolarizing filters Polarizing sunglasses
Video clip A
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sensory impressions when their visual acuity is degraded by different amounts. Today, 
you will both be in the 95% visual acuity condition. I will give you each a pair of 95% 
acuity glasses, which will degrade your vision slightly. If you already wear glasses, 
the acuity glasses should fit over the top.” (Garry et al., 2008, p. 433) 
After these instructions, the experimenter handed horizontal or vertical polarizing 
sunglasses randomly to the two participants. Each pair was taken out of a box labeled “95% 
acuity sunglasses.” To add authenticity to the cover story, other boxes were stacked next to 
the selected boxes, all labeled with different strengths of acuity. However, those other boxes 
were empty, and we always told participants that they were in the 95% visual acuity 
condition. The experimenter then continued as follows: 
“I am going to show you a short movie of a tradesman called Eric working in a house. 
Please make sure you watch the movie through the sunglasses (no peeking over the 
top or around the side) and keep your sunglasses on until I ask you to remove them. 
We find that people often see best when they keep their head straight rather than 
tilted.” (Garry et al., 2008, p. 434) 
The experimental session consisted of three phases. In Phase 1, participants watched 
the movie. The two versions of the video were presented on screen, while the participants 
sitting side-by-side observed the video; one viewer observed one version and the other viewer 
observed the other version (see the video clip showing how the MORI technique works 
[https://osf.io/cw9pd/]). Then, the experimenter gave each participant a printed logic puzzle 
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and participants worked individually on the puzzle for 15 minutes.  
In Phase 2, participants took part in a collaborative recognition test. The test was 
presented with PowerPoint on a laptop or desktop computer. In this test, participants were 
asked to answer 12 five-alternative questions aloud. On each question, we allowed the pairs 
to discuss their answers freely whether they matched or not. Each question inquired about a 
detail of the event and offered five possible responses (e.g., “Eric looked at a picture of ___: 
The Leaning Tower, The Tower of London, The Eiffel Tower, The Sky Tower, Trump 
Towers”). Of the 12 questions, four focused on the critical details in the movie, with both 
correct answers being included among the five response alternatives; the remaining eight 
questions targeted filler details for which both subjects had seen the same detail.  
For each critical question discussed during the collaboration phase, the experimenter 
recorded the answer that the pair of participants appeared to agree was correct; if each 
member of the pair maintained a different answer, then the experimenter recorded both 
answers. The other four conflicting details in the video were not discussed and thus served as 
controls in the individual recognition test. Which four critical details were discussed 
alternated across participant pairs. The collaboration phase was audio-video recorded in 
Canada and Japan, and audio recorded in all other countries except for Brazil, Colombia, and 
Portugal. After the collaboration task, participants worked individually on multiplication 
problems (3 digits by 3 digits) for 5 minutes.  
In Phase 3, participants completed an individual recognition test comprising 20 two-
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alternative forced-choice questions (paper-and-pencil). Of the 20 questions, eight targeted the 
critical questions (i.e., four discussed and four control questions) and participants had to 
choose between the alternative that they had seen versus the alternative that their partner had 
seen. The remaining 12 filler questions concerned details from the movie that had not been 
tested earlier. The participants indicated their confidence in each answer on a five-point scale, 
ranging from (1) ‘not at all confident’ to (5) ‘very confident’ but we do not report the 
confidence data here. 
Finally, participants were debriefed. The experimenter asked the participants 
whether they had noticed any anomalies during the video presentation and then explained the 
experimental manipulation. No participants reported any anomalies to the extent that they 
were judged to have intuited the critical manipulation. It took about 45-60 minutes to 
complete the experiment.  
Results 
First, we examine the co-witness suggestibility effect following the Garry et al. 
(2008) procedure. Like Garry et al., we analyzed the final-test accuracy scores for the critical 
questions across the 10 samples using analysis of variance (ANOVA). We then present a 
meta-analysis of the effect sizes of the suggestibility effects across the 10 samples and the 
Garry et al. sample. Finally, we compare the answering patterns for discussed items that were 
disputed versus non-disputed. 
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Main descriptive statistics and the data for the 10 countries are presented in the 
Supplemental Materials (downloadable from the OSF site [https://osf.io/qbejt/]). Figure 2 
shows average final-test accuracy on the filler, non-discussed, and discussed questions for 
each country, along with the original NZ results from Garry et al. (2008). Participants’ 
answers on the 12 filler questions on the individual recognition test (which had not been 
queried during the collaboration phase) provided a baseline measure of memory. Performance 
on the filler questions was roughly comparable to the 80% accuracy reported by Garry et al. 
Participants remembered these details above chance level (.50) in each country (all ps < .001). 
The average proportion of correct responses for the filler questions was entered into a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with country as the between-subjects factor. The effect 
of country was significant, F(9, 476) = 11.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Pairwise comparisons 
suggested that this effect was mainly due to lower recognition rates for the filler items in the 
Brazilian and Turkish samples.  
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Figure 2. Proportions of correct responses to filler, non-discussed, and discussed items for 
each country along with the original data from New Zealand. The co-witness effect is the 
difference between non-discussed and discussed items. Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
Following Garry et al. (2008), in scoring final-test accuracy on critical discussed 
questions, we included only questions for which the experimenter had recorded the co-
witness’s answer during the collaboration phase (i.e., provided an answer that contradicted 
what the participant had seen). In some pairs, one member was not exposed to any co-witness 
details during the collaboration phase (e.g., because they reported the details they had 
witnessed and their co-witness appeared to go along with those answers). For example, when 
one participant had seen a red cap and the other participant a black one and the first 
participant indicated that they had seen a red cap and the second participant did not say 
anything, then the first participant would not have discussed a co-witness detail whereas the 
second participant would have. Therefore, “discussed co-witness details” refers to details that 
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the experimenter recorded as having been reported by the participant’s co-witness.  
The number of discussed co-witness details for each participant did not significantly 
vary across the 10 samples, F(9, 476) = 1.09, p = .365, ηp2 = .02. Participants who were not 
exposed to co-witness details at all were excluded from the subsequent analyses. The number 
of participants excluded on this basis ranged from a low of 1 participant in the Canadian 
sample to a high of 13 participants in the Malaysian sample. There were no corresponding 
cases in the New Zealand sample of Garry et al. (2008). 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the final-test accuracy score for the 
critical questions, with discussion (non-discussed vs. discussed) as the within-subjects factor 
and country as the between-subjects factor. The results showed main effects of country, F(9, 
405) = 4.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, and discussion, F(1, 405) = 687.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, and 
an interaction, F(9, 405) = 2.46, p = .010, ηp2 = .05. The effect of discussion was significant 
for each country, all ps < .001: Participants were more likely to report the correct answer for 
non-discussed questions than for discussed ones, thus replicating the original findings of 
Garry et al. (2008).   
To obtain a general estimate of the co-witness suggestibility effect, we conducted a 
meta-analysis with the effect sizes from Garry et al. (2008) and from our 10 countries (see the 
Supplemental Materials for technical details on the meta-analysis and formulae). Figure 3 
summarizes the main results of the meta-analysis and shows that the effect sizes (Hedges’ g) 
of all the countries showed positive and large values. The meta-analysis revealed a combined 
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effect size of g = 1.67, 95% CI [1.40, 1.94], Z = 12.19, p < .001. Without the New Zealand 
sample, the combined effect size was g = 1.70, 95% CI [1.40, 1.99], Z = 11.17, p < .001. 
These two effect sizes translate to 80.2% (and 81.5%) of the items in which the participant 
was exposed to misleading information from the co-witness being answered incorrectly. 
Because participants were on average exposed to misinformation for 1.61 (and 1.58) items, 
each participant made 1.29 (and 1.29) errors due to the fact that they had been exposed to 
misinformation from the co-witness. 
 
Figure 3. Forest plot with the effect sizes for each country, including the original New 
Zealand sample. The location of each square on the horizontal axis represents the effect 
size—the standardized difference between the mean correct responses in the discussed and 
non-discussed conditions (positive values indicate a higher mean proportion of correct 
responses to non-discussed items). The lines extending either side of the square represent a 
95% confidence interval (CI). The size of each square represents the weight of each study in 
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the meta-analysis. The diamond shows the result of the meta-analyses, with the center 
indicating the combined effect size and the spread representing the 95% CI.  
 
The co-witness suggestibility effect varied from 34% in the Colombian sample to 
64% in the Japanese sample, which likely caused the significant interaction in the ANOVA 
reported above. To examine which countries differed, we conducted a series of pairwise 
comparisons. We computed the proportion of correct responses for non-discussed questions 
minus the proportion of correct responses for discussed questions per country (i.e., the co-
witness suggestibility effect) and compared all samples (Bonferroni correction was applied 
and alpha was set at .001). The analyses showed a larger effect for the Japanese than the 
Canadian and Colombian samples (p = .012 and p = .016). All other pairwise comparisons 
were not significant, ps > .265.  
As noted above, following Garry et al. (2008), final-test accuracy scores on critical 
discussed questions were contingent on the experimenter having recorded the co-witness’s 
answer during the collaboration phase (which meant that the participant’s co-witness had 
maintained that answer during the collaboration phase). Usually, only one answer was 
recorded for each critical discussed question; one member of the pair reported the detail that 
he or she had seen and the other did not dispute that report. However, sometimes each 
member of the pair stated the answer that he or she had seen. In an exploratory sub-analysis 
(not reported in Garry et al., 2008), we differentiated between critical discussed questions for 
which only one co-witness reported the answer he or she had witnessed during the 
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collaboration phase (i.e., non-disputed co-witness answers) and those for which both co-
witnesses reported the answers they had seen (i.e., disputed co-witness answers). 
As Table 2 shows, for the vast majority of critical discussed questions, only one 
answer was recorded during the collaboration phase (i.e., most were non-disputed). Across 
the 10 samples, there were 708 non-disputed and only 58 disputed co-witness answers. When 
the co-witness’s answer was coded as non-disputed during the collaboration phase, witnesses 
later erred by reporting that answer on the final test in 626 of the 708 cases (88.4%). In 
contrast, across the 58 cases of disputed co-witness answers, only in one case (1.8%) did the 
witness err on the final test by reporting the co-witness’s detail.  
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Table 2. Number of erroneous and correct responses in the non-disputed and disputed cases. 
Country N of 
Participants 
Total cases of 
“Discussed” 
items 
Non-disputed Cases Disputed Cases 
Freq. of 
Errors 
(%)  
Freq. of 
Corrects 
(%) 
Freq. of 
Errors 
 (%) 
Freq. of 
Corrects 
(%) 
Brazil 40 64 56 (87.5) 
8  
(12.5) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
Canada 42 84 52 (61.9) 
2 
(2.3) 
0 
(0.0) 
30 
(35.7) 
Colombia 40 63 44 (69.8) 
9 
(14.3) 
0 
(0.0) 
10 
(15.9) 
India 40 64 49 (76.6) 
9 
(14.1) 
1 
(1.6) 
5 
(7.8) 
Japan 40 62 57 (91.9) 
5 
(8.1) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
Malaysia 64 98 84 (85.7) 
14 
(14.3) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
Poland 62 91 83 (91.2) 
4 
(4.4) 
0 
(0.0) 
4 
(4.4) 
Portugal 40 63 48 (76.2) 
9 
(14.3) 
0 
(0.0) 
6 
(9.5) 
Turkey 60 86 76 (88.4) 
8 
(9.3) 
0 
(0.0) 
2 
(2.3) 
UK 58 91 77 (84.6) 
14 
(15.4) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
Total 486 766 626 (81.7) 
82 
(10.7) 
1 
(0.1) 
57 
(7.4) 
 
There was a striking national difference in the frequency of disputed co-witness 
answers (i.e., cases in which during collaboration both participants stated the answer that they 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  23 
 
 
had observed in the video). Of the 58 cases of disputed co-witness answers, 30 (51.7%) were 
in the Canadian sample and 10 (17.2%) were in the Colombian sample, with the remaining 18 
cases scattered across the 404 participants from the other eight countries. In four of the 
samples not a single instance of a disputed answer was recorded. The high accuracy rate on 
critical discussed items in the Canadian and Colombian samples apparently arose from the 
high rates of disputed co-witness details in those two samples. When analyses were restricted 
to critical discussed questions with non-disputed co-witness answers, accuracy did not 
significantly differ across countries (e.g., for the Japanese sample, 5 out of 62 cases, or 8.1%; 
for the Canadian sample, 2 out of 54 cases, or 3.7%; for Colombian sample, 9 of 53, or 
17.0%), χ2(9) = 13.92, p = .125, Cramer’s V = .140.  
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the replicability of the co-witness 
suggestibility effect across 10 countries. We successfully replicated the findings of Garry et 
al. (2008) in each sample: Accuracy on the final individual recognition test was lower for 
critical discussed questions than for non-discussed control questions. The effect size across 
the 10 samples (Hedges’ g = 1.70, 95% CI: 1.40–1.94) was comparable to the effect size 
reported by Garry et al. (Hedges’ g = 1.46, 95% CI: 0.85–2.07).  
The results were for the most part similar across the 10 countries, with the co-
witness suggestibility effect statistically significant in each country. That said, the effect was 
statistically significantly larger in the Japanese sample than in the Canadian and Colombian 
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samples. An unplanned sub-analysis indicated that this difference was associated with 
differences between these samples in the frequency with which subjects disputed their co-
witness’s reports during the collaboration phase. In the Japanese sample, there was not a 
single case in which the answer to a critical discussed question was coded as disputed, 
whereas in the Canadian and Colombian samples a nontrivial percentage of co-witness details 
were coded as disputed.  
It is not surprising that subjects were less influenced by co-witness suggestions that 
they had disputed during the discussion phase than by those they had appeared to accept, but 
we do not know why disputation was so rare in the Japanese sample, especially compared to 
the Canadian and Colombian samples. Some readers might speculate that this has to do with 
Japan being a relatively collectivist culture, but among the countries tested, Colombia is said 
to be the most collectivistic (Hofstede, 2001), whereas Canada is among the most 
individualistic. The differences across cultures in the rate of disputing critical answers 
therefore do not fit an interpretation that the co-witness suggestibility effect would be larger 
in collectivistic cultures.  
Other studies have explored the nature of co-witness discussion and its association 
with collaborative memory distortions. For instance, Gabbert et al. (2006) reported that, in 
two studies in which co-witnesses had viewed different versions of the same event and then 
collaborated before being tested individually, the participant who mentioned a critical detail 
first was more likely to influence the other participant. Note, however, that Gabbert et al.’s 
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analyses were collapsed across cases in which both collaborators reported the detail they had 
witnessed and cases in which only one collaborator reported the detail they had witnessed. 
The latter cases cannot shed any light on an order effect, per se (see Lindsay, 2007), thus 
further research is needed to understand the role of order effects, if any, in collaborative 
memory contamination. The current study, however, reveals a novel finding about the nature 
of co-witness discussion and its influence on witness memory: Participants were only likely 
to report erroneous information gleaned from a collaborator if they did not, during the co-
witness discussion phase, report the detail they had personally witnessed. That is, when 
witnesses did not dispute the co-witness report during collaboration, they almost always 
subsequently erred on the individual recognition test by claiming to have witnessed the detail 
their co-witness had seen. However, if they had disputed the co-witness’s report during 
collaboration, they almost never later made that error. A related finding comes from 
Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus (1986). They reported that participants who read slowly (or who 
were instructed to read slowly) were more likely to detect discrepancies between original and 
post-event information and were therefore less vulnerable to accepting misinformation. It is 
possible that the participants in our study who disputed their co-witness’ reports detected the 
difference between what they had seen and what their partner reported during the discussion. 
As such they were less likely to accept misinformation than the participants who did not 
dispute their co-witness’ reports.  
In the context of the co-witness suggestibility effect, this finding is novel, but it fits 
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with other findings in the literature. For example, in Ackil and Zaragoza (1998), participant-
pairs viewed a short video. Immediately after the video, among a series of valid questions, 
participants were given misleading questions. For half the pairs, one of the two participants 
was told only to answer the questions about which they were certain of the response. For the 
other half, one of the two participants was forced to answer the questions and to guess the 
answer if they were unsure. In both conditions, the partners just listened. One week later, all 
participants received a source memory test. The participants who were forced to answer the 
misleading questions often attributed their forced confabulations to the video. Moreover, their 
partners (who were merely exposed to the forced confabulations), also sometimes 
misattributed the confabulated details to the video. Similar to the participants in our study 
who did not dispute their co-witness’ reports, the participants who were merely exposed to 
the forced confabulations seemed to rely on their partners’ answers.  
A comprehensive theory of collaborative remembering could explain the conditions 
under which co-witnesses help each other recall details or aid each other in confirming the 
correctness of details, versus hurt each other’s recollections by introducing inaccurate details. 
That is, co-witness discussion can be a source of memory distortion, but it can also fill 
memory gaps and enhance accuracy if the co-witnesses’ individual reports are accurate (e.g., 
Vredeveldt, Groen, Ampt, & Van Koppen, 2017). This interpretation is consistent with other 
evidence that discussants sometimes help each other remember more details and can even 
correct instances of misleading post-event information (Karns, Irvin, Suranic, & Rivardo, 
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2009; Ross, Spencer, Blatz, & Restorick, 2008).  
The instructions for the final recognition test made explicit that “we are testing your 
memory for this video.” Nonetheless, these instructions do not necessarily mean that when 
participants selected a co-witness detail on the test that they were experiencing a false 
memory of having seen that detail in the video. They may instead have knowingly relied on 
their memories from the discussion phase of what their co-witnesses had said. Further 
research is required to investigate the subjective phenomenology that accompanies the reports 
of co-witness details in this procedure. 
Our project is an example of an international collaboration focused on direct 
replication of an established effect. The importance of conducting large-scale replications like 
this one is particularly significant for issues that have direct implications for real-world 
practice. It is vitally important that psychologists, both basic and applied, continue to 
investigate the possibility of file drawer effects leading to effect size overestimation for 
findings that have influenced practitioners in their relevant fields.  
In conclusion, we replicated in 10 countries (i.e., Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, 
Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) the co-witness 
suggestibility effect by using the MORI technique first tested by Garry et al. (2008) in New 
Zealand. Whether people experience actual memory distortions or simply trust their partner 
to be correct, our results show that people tend to incorporate elements of the other witness’ 
memory reports into their own memory reports, even when that information contradicts what 
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they themselves had seen. It is particularly noteworthy that all 10 samples showed similar 
results with large effect sizes in spite of the cultural differences. The consistency in the size 
of the effect across countries is good evidence that the co-witness suggestibility effect 
remains similar in a dyad regardless of the individualistic or collectivistic tendencies of the 
culture within which the interaction occurs.  
  
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  29 
 
 
Author Contributions 
Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Kazuo Mori at 
Matsumoto University. This research was supported by a Grant-in-Aid from the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science (KAKENHI No. 25280050) to Kazuo Mori and a grant 
from Aichi University (KENKYUJYOSBEI No. C-180) to Hiroshi Ito. KM and HI were also 
supported by the Joint Research Grant 2017 from the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation 
for Private Schools of Japan to Matsumoto University for a cooperative research with Aichi 
University. 
While conducting the study and writing of the manuscript, Krystian Barzykowski 
was supported by a grant from the National Science Centre, Poland [no.: 
2015/19/D/HS6/00641]. Nicole Laird’s work on this project was supported by a Natural 
Science and Engineering Research Council Discovery Grant to D. Stephen Lindsay. 
Hiroshi Ito and Kazuo Mori initiated the project and invited the other authors to take 
part. The authors conducted the experiments in their respective countries and provided the 
data for the project. Hiroshi Ito, Karlos Luna, and Steve Janssen analyzed the entire dataset, 
and all authors discussed the results. Hiroshi Ito drafted the manuscript and all other authors 
provided critical revisions. All authors approved the manuscript before submission. 
We are grateful to Maryanne Garry and Lauren Hewitt (née French) for providing 
the experimental materials used in their study. We also thank Tahir Chatur for his help setting 
the equipment in Canada.  
  
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  30 
 
 
References 
Ackil, J. K., & Zaragoza, M. S. (1998). Memorial consequences of forced confabulation: Age 
differences in susceptibility to false memories. Developmental Psychology, 34, 1358–
1372. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.34.6.1358 
Bodner, G. E., Musch, E., & Azad, T. (2009). Reevaluating the potency of the memory 
conformity effect. Memory & Cognition, 37(8), 1069–1076. 
doi:10.3758/MC.37.8.1069 
Borenstein, M. (2009). Effect sizes for continuous data. In H. Cooper, L. V. Hedges, & J. C. 
Valentine (Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis and meta-analysis (2nd Ed.) (pp. 
221–235). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Bright-Paul, A., Jarrold, C., Wright, D. B., & Guillaume, S. (2012). Children’s memory 
distortions following social contact with a co-witness: Disentangling social and 
cognitive mechanisms. Memory, 20(6), 580–595. doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.690039 
Condon, C. E., Ritchie, T. D., & Igou, E. R. (2015). How dyads reminiscence moderates the 
relations between familiarity, trust, and memory conformity. Social Psychology, 46(2), 
65–75. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000222 
Cumming, G. (2012). Understanding the new statistics: Effect sizes, confidence intervals, and 
meta-analysis. New York: Routledge.  
Davis, S. D., & Meade, M. L. (2013). Both young and older adults discount suggestions from 
older adults on a social memory test. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(4), 760–765. 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  31 
 
 
doi:10.3758/s13423- 013-0392-5 
French, L., Garry, M., & Mori, K. (2008). You say tomato? Collaborative remembering leads 
to more false memories for intimate couples than for strangers. Memory, 16(3), 262–
273. doi:10.1080/09658210701801491 
French, L., Garry, M., & Mori, K. (2011). Relative―not absolute―judgments of credibility 
affect susceptibility to misinformation conveyed during discussion. Acta Psychologica, 
136(1), 119–128. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.10.009 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Allan, K. (2003). Memory conformity: Can eyewitnesses 
influence each other’s memories for an event? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17(5), 
533–543. doi:10.1002/acp.885 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., Allan, K., & Wright, D. B. (2004). Say it to my face: Examining the 
effects of socially encountered misinformation. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 
9(2), 215–227. doi:10.1348/1355325041719428 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Wright, D. B. (2006). Memory conformity: Disentangling the 
steps toward influence during a discussion. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(3), 
480–485. doi:10.3758/BF03193873 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Wright, D. B. (2007). I saw it for longer than you: The 
relationship between perceived encoding duration and memory conformity. Acta 
Psychologica, 124(3), 319–331. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.03.009 
Garry, M., French, L., Kinzett, T., & Mori, K. (2008). Eyewitness memory following 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  32 
 
 
discussion: Using the MORI technique with a western sample. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 22(4), 431–439. doi:10.1002/acp.1376 
Hedges, L. V. (1981). Distribution theory for Glass's estimator of effect size and related 
estimators. Journal of Educational Statistics, 6(2), 107–128. 
doi:10.3102/10769986006002107 
Hewitt, L. Y., Kane, R., & Garry, M. (2013). Speaking order predicts memory conformity 
after accounting for exposure to misinformation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
20(3), 558–565. doi:10.3758/s13423-013-0377-4 
Hirokawa, K., Matsuno, E., Mori, K., & Ukita, J. (2006) Relationship between masculinity-
femininity and concession in an experimental collaborative eyewitness testimony. 
Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 9(2), 132–139. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
839X.2006.00190.x 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and 
organizations across nations (2nd Edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hope, L., Ost, J., Gabbert, F., Healey, S., & Lenton, E. (2008). “With a little help from my 
friends…”: The role of co-witness relationship in susceptibility to misinformation. 
Acta Psychologica, 127(2), 476–484. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.010 
Jack, F., Zydervelt, S., & Zajac, R. (2014). Are co-witnesses special? Comparing the 
influence of co-witness and interviewer misinformation on eyewitness reports. 
Memory, 22(3), 243–255. doi:10.1080/09658211.2013.778291 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  33 
 
 
Kanematsu, H., Mori, K., & Mori, H. (1996/2003). Kotonaru jitai wo mokugekishita futari no 
mokugekisha no hanashiai niyoru kioku no hen-you [Memory distortion in eyewitness 
pairs who observed nonconforming events and discussed them]. Cognitive Studies: 
Bulletin of the Japanese Cognitive Science Society, 3, 29–40 [English version was 
published in Journal of Faculty of Education (2003, Shinshu University, Nagano, 
Japan), 109, 75–84]. 
Karns, T. E., Irvin, S. J., Suranic, S. L., & Rivardo, M. G. (2009). Collaborative recall 
reduces the effect of a misleading post event narrative. North American Journal of 
Psychology, 11(1), 17–28. 
Lindsay, D. S. (2007). Order effects in collaborative memory contamination? Comment on 
Gabbert, Memon, and Wright (2006)? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 1010. 
doi:10.3758/BF03194137 
Lindsay, D. S. (2015). Replication in psychological science. Psychological Science, 26(12), 
1827–1832. doi:10.1177/0956797615616374 
Lindsay, D. S., Simons, D. J., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2016, December). Research preregistration 
101. Observer, 29, 14–16. 
Meade, M. L., McNabb, J. C., Lindeman, M. I., & Smith, J. L. (2017). Discounting input 
from older adults: The role of age salience on partner age effects in the social 
contagion of memory. Memory, 25(5), 704–716. 
doi:10.1080/09658211.2016.1207783 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  34 
 
 
Mori, K. (2007). A revised method for projecting two different movies to two groups of 
viewers without their noticing the duality. Behavior Research Methods, 39(3), 574–
578. doi:10.3758/BF03193028 
Mori, K., & Kitabayashi, M. (2009). How child-mother pairs reported what they had 
witnessed together: An experimental examination using the MORI technique. 
Psychology Journal, 6(2), 60–69. 
Mori, K., & Mori, H. (2008). Conformity among cowitnesses sharing same or different 
information about an event in experimental collaborative eyewitness testimony. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 106(1), 275–290. doi:10.2466/pms.106.1.275-290 
Mori, K., & Takahashi, R. (2012). Pre-schoolers’ reports of conflicting points secretly 
inserted into a co-witnessed event: An experimental investigation using the MORI 
technique. Psychology, 3(1), 30–35. doi:10.4236/psych.2012.31005 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. 
Science, 349, 943. doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 
Paterson, H. M., & Kemp, R. I. (2006). Co-witnesses talk: A survey of eyewitness discussion. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 12(2), 181–191. doi:10.1080/10683160512331316334 
Paterson, H. M., Kemp, R., & McIntyre, S. (2012). Can a witness report hearsay evidence 
unintentionally? The effects of discussion on eyewitness memory. Psychology, Crime 
& Law, 18(6), 505–527. doi:10.1080/1068316X.2010.510117 
Ross, M., Spencer, S. J., Blatz, C. W., & Restorick, E. (2008). Collaboration reduces the 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  35 
 
 
frequency of false memories in older and younger adults. Psychology and Aging, 
23(1), 85–92. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.23.1.85 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: 
Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as 
significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359–1366. doi:10.1177/0956797611417632  
Simons, D. J., Holcombe, A. O., & Spellman, B. A. (2014). An introduction to registered 
replication reports at Perspectives in Psychological Science. Perspectives in 
Psychological Science, 6, 552–555. doi:10.1177/1745691614543974 
Skagerberg, E. M., & Wright, D. B. (2008). The prevalence of co-witnesses and co-witness 
discussions in real eyewitnesses. Psychology, Crime & Law, 14(6), 513–521. 
doi:10.1080/10683160801948980 
Tainaka, T., Miyoshi, T., & Mori, K. (2014). Conformity of witnesses with low self-esteem 
to their co-witnesses. Psychology, 5, 1695–1701. doi:10.4236/psych.2014.515177 
Takarangi, M. K. T., Parker, S. L., & Garry, M. (2006). Modernizing the misinformation 
effect: The development of a new stimulus set. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(5), 
583–590. doi:10.1002/acp.1209 
Tousignant, J. P., Hall, D., & Loftus, E. F. (1986). Discrepancy detection and vulnerability to 
misleading postevent information. Memory & Cognition, 14, 329–338. 
doi:10.3758/BF03202511 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. Journal of 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  36 
 
 
Statistical Software, 36(3), 1–48. Retrieved from http://www.jstatsoft.org/v36/i03/  
Vredeveldt, A., Groen, R. N., Ampt, J. E., & Van Koppen, P. J. (2017). When discussion 
between eyewitnesses helps memory. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 22(2), 
242–259. doi:10.1111/lcrp.12097 
Wright, D. B., Busnello, R. H. D., Buratto, L. G., & Stein, L. M. (2012). Are valence and 
social avoidance associated with the memory conformity effect? Acta Psychologica, 
141(1), 78–85. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.06.008 
Wright, D. B., London, K., & Waechter, M. (2010). Social anxiety moderates memory 
conformity in adolescents. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(7), 1034–1045. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1604 
Wright, D. B., Memon, A., Skagerberg, E. M., & Gabbert, F. (2009). When eyewitnesses 
talk. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(3), 174–178. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01631.x 
  
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION  37 
 
 
Supplemental Materials  
Table S1. Mean (Standard Error) and [95% Confidence Interval] for each of the main 
measures per country. For filler, non-discussed and discussed items, proportion of correct 
recognition is shown. 
 
Proportion of 
Correct 
Recognition: 
Filler Items 
Proportion of 
Discussed 
Items for 
which Co-
Witness 
Answered 
Proportion of 
Correct 
Recognition: 
Non-
Discussed 
Items (X) 
Proportion of 
Correct 
Recognition: 
"Discussed" 
Items (Y) 
Co-Witness Effect  
(X-Y) 
Brazil .62 (.02) [.58, .66] 
.40 (.05) 
[.30, .50] 
.54 (.04) 
[.45, .63] 
.11 (.04) 
[.02, .19] 43% 
Canada .84 (.02) [.80, .87] 
.50 (.04) 
[.43, .57] 
.70 (.04) 
[.62, .77] 
.35 (.05) 
[.24, .46] 35% 
Colombia .81 (.02) [.77, .85] 
.39 (.04) 
[.32, .47] 
.66 (.03) 
[.58, .73] 
.32 (.07) 
[.18, .45] 34% 
India .68 (.02) [.64, .72] 
.40 (.04) 
[.32, .48] 
.65 (.04) 
[.57, .74] 
.25 (.07) 
[.11, .38] 40% 
Japan .75 (.02) [.71, .79] 
.39 (.04) 
[.32, .46] 
.71 (.03) 
[.64, .79] 
.07 (.03) 
[0, .14] 64% 
Malaysia .74 (.01) [.70, .77] 
.38 (.04) 
[.31, .45] 
.61(.03) 
[.54, .68] 
.13 (.04) 
[.05, .20] 48% 
Poland .73 (.02) [.70, .77] 
.37 (.03) 
[.31, .42] 
.58 (.04) 
[.50, .66] 
.08 (.03) 
[.03, .14] 50% 
Portugal .81 (.03) [.76, .87] 
.39 (.03) 
[.33, .46] 
.74 (.03) 
[.68, .80] 
.22 (.05) 
[.11, .33] 52% 
Turkey .68 (.02) [.64, .72] 
.36 (.03) 
[.33, .46] 
.64 (.03) 
[.57, .70] 
.10 (.03) 
[.04, .17] 54% 
United 
Kingdom 
.80 (.01) 
[.77, .83] 
.39 (.03) 
[.33, .45] 
.62 (.03) 
[.54, .69] 
.14 (.04) 
[.06, .22] 48% 
 
Meta-Analysis Formulae 
For the meta-analyses we used the “metafor” package (Viechtbauer, 2010) for R. We 
ran a random-effects model and the weighting of each study was determined by the inverse of 
the sampling variance. 
As measure for the meta-analysis, we computed Cohen’s d for each study following 
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the formulae in Cumming (2012): d= 𝑀$% −𝑀%'SD$%* +SD%*2  
where MND and SDND are the mean and standard deviation for the proportion of 
correct recognition for non-discussed items, and MD and SDD are the mean and standard 
deviation for discussed items. Then, we applied the bias correction proposed by Hedges 
(1981): 
Hedges’ g = -1 − /012345 𝑑 
In a within-subjects design df is n – 1. The sampling variance of g was computed 
following Equation 12.19 of Borenstein (2009), where n is the number of participants and r is 
the correlation between memory for items discussed and not discussed:  𝑣8 = 91𝑛 + 𝑔*2𝑛<2(1 − 𝑟) 
